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My Response to Ramseyer’s Effort to Deny the History of
Japanese Military Sexual Slavery
By Pyong Gap Min1
Abstract
The main objective of this paper is to critically evaluate as many of Ramseyer’s arguments
as possible included in his 2022 paper. It consists of three sections in addition to the introduction
and concluding remarks. The first section summarizes the expanded literature that interpreted the
“comfort women” system as sexual slavery, judgments, and recommendations to the Japanese
government given by scholars, international human rights organizations and the legislative
branches of four Western countries. Since Ramseyer published his article denying the “comfort
women” system as sexual slavery without introducing this literature, we cannot consider his article
as an academic work. The second section critically evaluates Ramseyer’s unacceptable and
untenable arguments that Japanese and Korean “comfort women” were commercial sex workers
with labor contracts rather than sexual slaves. The third section critically evaluates Ramseyer’s
severe criticisms of the Korean council and its redress activities.

Keywords: the “comfort women” issue; Japanese military sexual slavery; human
rights organizations; international law; wartime sexual violence; “comfort women.”
Introduction
At the end of December 2020, I heard the news that a paper by J. Mark Ramseyer, a Harvard
Law School professor, interpreting Japanese and Korean “comfort women” as voluntary sex
workers with labor contracts, was accepted for publication in International Journal of Law and
Economics. It shocked me. Many international human rights organizations, including the UN
Commission on Human Rights and the Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal, interpreted
the “comfort women” system (CWS) as a perfect form of sexual slavery. Even the Japanese
government accepted “comfort women” as sexual slaves by recognizing the forced mobilization
of most Korean “comfort women.” Thus, Ramseyer’s denial of the CWS as sexual slavery is
1
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analogous to Donald Trump’s rejection of Joe Biden’s victory in the 2020 presidential election, in
its denial and manipulation of truth. I knew that dozens of Japanese revisionist scholars published
many Japanese-language at least magazine/journal articles and books which treated Asian
“comfort women” as sex workers who had made a lot of money. But I had never imagined the
possibility of publication of an article claiming “comfort women” as voluntary sex workers with
labor contracts in an English-language international journal in the United States.
In order to reject the CWS as sexual slavery, Ramseyer needed to write at least a long
article including a review of the literature, and data that indisputably contested “comfort women”
as sexual slaves. But he wrote only a 5.5-page article, excluding the introduction and the
conclusion. I did not see any new data source in his short article, with the exception of Japanese
and Korean historical revisionist scholars’ works, to support his claim of Japanese and Korean
“comfort women” as voluntary sex workers under labor contracts. In his effort to rebut his critics’
arguments, he wrote a long 65-page paper in response to his critics, to reject the CWS as sexual
slavery and to criticize the Korean Council for the Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by
Japan (referred to the Korean Council although the name was changed to the Korean Council for
the Justice and Remembrance for the Comfort Women Issues in 2017). In his responses to his
critics, he emphasized his academic interest in writing his 2021 article to explain how “comfort
women” and brothel owners agreed on labor contracts using game theory. By emphasizing the
theoretical component of his study (Ramseyer, 2022, 3), he tried to hide his motivation to deny
sexual slavery. However, his criticisms of his critics and his attacks on the Korean Council reveal
his strong motivation to spread Japanese history denialists’ propaganda to the U.S. academia, using
an academic theory as a camouflage. He did not need to explain how the two parties agreed on
labor contracts until he demonstrated that the CWS was not sexual slavery. Thus, explaining the
processes of reaching contracts is not a research issue pertaining to the “comfort women” issue
(hereafter referred to as CWI).
This paper consists of three major substantive sections in addition to the introduction and
the conclusion. The first substantive section will provide a review of the extensive literature on the
CWS as sexual slavery, which was strongly accepted and judged by many international human
rights organizations, several countries’ governments, and many scholars. The second substantive
section will critically evaluate Ramseyer’s arguments to deny the CWS as sexual slavery. As
Yoshimi (2013) aptly pointed out, Japanese historical documents did not include much information
about the forced mobilization of “comfort women” and their brutal treatments at Japanese military
brothels (hereafter referred to as JMB), as criminals do not write down whom they plan to kill.
Accordingly, it is important to use “comfort women’s” testimonies as credible evidence for their
forced mobilization to JMB, and their sufferings of brutal treatment at the hands of Japanese
soldiers. I plan to use KCW’s testimonies extensively in critically evaluating Ramseyer’s
arguments for rejecting KCW as sexual slaves. Showing KCW’s brutal treatment at the hands of
JMB is also partly my response to the request by the Crimson Editorial Board of Harvard
University that “scholars should focus their ‘collective attention on the issues most urgently at
stake” and “a clear view of the horror these women faced…” (Crimson Editorial Board, 2022: 2).
The third substantive section will critically examine Ramseyer’s unjustifiable attacks on
the Korean Council and its redress activities. Like other Japanese historical revisionists, he has
attacked the Korean Council, progressive “comfort women” scholars, and redress activists in
Korea and the United States as “anti-Japan,” “communists,” and “Stalinists.” I will show that a
large number of Japanese citizens supported the redress movement led by the Korean Council and
that therefore it is not a pro-Japan or anti-Japan issue.
I plan to provide detailed literature on the CWI and the redress movement and extended
discussions on the various issues related to both, not only for Ramseyer, but also for other scholars,
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faculty members, journal editors, and college students. I hope it will be helpful to the editorial
committee members of International Journal of Laws and Economics, which accepted Ramseyer’s
paper for publication in their journal and have not made a decision to detract his unacceptable
article. I also hope that a comprehensive literature review and extended discussion will be helpful
to faculty members and students at Harvard University, where Ramseyer has maintained his
academic position without much difficulty despite his controversial article and paper.

Scholars’ and Human Rights Organizations’ Interpretation of the “Comfort
Women” System as Sexual Slavery and their Recommendations to the Japanese
Government
It has been more than thirty years since the redress movement for the victims of Japanese
military sexual slavery started in South Korea. There were two impetuses for the redress movement
for the victims of Japanese military sexual slavery in Korea. One was the Korean women leaders’
acquisition of the Japanese Diet’s minutes in June 1990, which included exchanges between
Motooka Shoji, a member of the Japan Socialist Party, and Director-General Shimizu Tsutao of
the Employment Security Bureau of the Japanese government. In a Diet Budget Committee
meeting on June 6, 1990, Shoji pointed out that the Japanese government had forcibly drafted 1.5
million people from the Korean peninsula for military and labor services, and that it had hunted
young Korean women to serve as sexual slaves (the Korean Council, 2014, 45). This information
led Korean women’s leaders to establish the Chungshindae Daechaek Hyopeuhe (the Korean
Council for the Women Drafted for Military Sexual Savery by Japan) to formally start the redress
movement. The Korean Council made six demands to the Japanese government through the
Japanese Consulate General in Seoul (H. C. Lee, 1997, 314).
The other impetus was the press conference of Kim Hak-sun, the first KCW who broke
silence, on August 14, 1991.The acquisition of the Diet minutes by Korean women’s leaders
strengthened their determination to organize the Korean Council for the redress movement. On the
other hand, the emergence and public testimony of Kim Hak-sun expanded the scope of the redress
movement in Korea to a global redress movement. The battlefield of the redress movement was
no longer Korea and Japan, but the United States, Europe, UN and other international human rights
organizations.
In January 1992, Yoshiaki Yoshimi, a renowned Japanese historian, discovered a set of
Japanese military government documents that demonstrated the Japanese military government’s
establishment and management of JMB and the forced mobilization of Asian women to these
brothels. His discovery of key historical documents forced the Japanese government to interview
over 20 Korean “comfort women” (KCW). Based on historical and testimonial data in 1993, the
Japanese government issued the Kōno Statement, which acknowledged the forcible mobilization
of Asian “comfort women.” However, the emergence of historical revisionism in Japan from 1995
on has led the Japanese government to deny that the “comfort women” system (CWS) was a wellcoordinated and institutionalized system of sexual slavery. In response, many scholars have
conducted research and found other documents and evidence that support Yoshimi’s findings
(Chung, 2017; Hayashi, 2015; Nishino, Kim and Akane, 2018; Oiu et al., 2014; Yoshimi, 2000).
Moreover, renowned legal scholars representing international human rights organizations
have investigated the CWS and concluded that it was indeed a quintessential form of sexual slavery.
Based on their investigations, international human rights organizations and legistrative branches
of four countries have sent over 20 resolutions to the Japanese government. Included in these
resolutions are recommendations that the Japanese government investigate the CWS and reveal
the details of the CWS, acknowledge it as sexual slavery, make a sincere apology and
compensation to the victims, punish those responsible for the sexual slavery system, and take
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educational measures for Japan not to repeat it by including information in history textbooks and
building “comfort women” memorials. The international organizations include the UN
Commission on Human Rights (which has sent several resolutions), Amnesty International, the
International Labor Organization, and the International Committee of Jurists (Coomaraswamy,
1996; Dolgopal and Paranjape, 1994; McDougall, 1997).
In addition, Japanese, Korean, and other Asian women’s redress organizations organized
the Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal on Japanese Military Sexual Slavery, a global
citizens’ court, in Tokyo in December 2000 to locate the perpetrators of the crime of sexual slavery
and file criminal charges against them. The six judges selected from internationally-known legal
scholars, several prosecutors from seven victim countries, and about 70 “comfort women”
survivors participated in the three-day court to render legal judgments. They asked the Japanese
government to send lawyers to defend its position. However, it did not send representatives, most
likely because they knew that their position was indefensible. Christine Chinkin, one of the judges,
wrote:
The judges had found Emperor Hirohito guilty of the charges on the basis of
compound responsibility, which means he knew or should have known of the
offenses. The evidence showed that the comfort stations had been systematically
instituted and operated as a matter of military policy, and that they committed
crimes against humanity under the law then applicable. The judges also indicated
that they had determined Japan to be responsible under international law applicable
at the time of the events for violations of its treaty obligations and principles of
customary international laws relating to slavery, trafficking, forced labor, and rape,
amounting to crimes against humanity. The judges also convicted nine other
Japanese civilian and military leaders of having institutionalized rape and sexual
slavery (Chinkin, 2002, 338).
Four major Western countries’ (the United States, Canada, the European Union, and the
Netherlands) legislative branches also sent strong resolutions to the Japanese government, pressing
it to take responsible measures quickly to resolve the CWI in 2007. I here introduce the U.S. House
Resolution 121’s passage on July 30, 2007. To get the resolution passed, the U.S. House of
Representatives conducted research using historical documents to make sure the CWS was sexual
slavery. It also held a hearing in which three “comfort women” survivors gave testimonies to
Congressional members. Despite the Japanese government’s active lobbying effort, the resolution
was passed unanimously by the House of Representatives (U.S House of Representatives, 2007).
It includes four strongly-worded recommendations to the Japanese government. The first
recommendation was that “the Government of Japan should formally acknowledge, apologize, and
accept historical responsibility in a clear and unequivocal manner for its Imperial Armed Forces’
coercion of young women into sexual slavery.” The third recommendation said, “The Japanese
government should clearly and publicly refute the claim that the sexual enslavement and
trafficking of the comfort women for the Imperial Armed Forces never occurred” (quoted in
Korean Council 2015, 362).
Ramseyer pretended to have used game theory to explain how “comfort women” as free
individuals reached agreements on labor contracts with the owners of “comfort stations” based on
the false assumption that all “comfort women” could make independent rational decisions.
However, previous studies have shown that almost all of them were forcibly mobilized to JMB
and forced to sexually serve Japanese soldiers under tight surveillance there. Thus, we need to use
intersectional theory combining the imperial war, colonization (occupation), gender hierarchy, and
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social class to explain their brutal experiences (Min 2003 & 2021, 19-29). As a law professor at
Harvard University, Ramseyer should have known that four powerful structural factors, including
gender hierarchy especially in Japan, the imperial war, Japan’s colonization and occupation of
Asian countries, and the low-class background of ACW were the major contributing factors (Min,
2003, 2021) to their forced mobilization to JMB and their suffering of the most brutal form of
sexual slavery. But instead, he pretended to have examined using game theory how the ACW made
voluntary decisions on labor contracts with the owners of JMB to maximize their interest. He
naively claimed several times in his 2022 rebuttal to his critics that he focused on empirical
findings and did not assert his own value judgement. But we all know that Ramseyer tried to save
Japanese historical denialists by replacing the sexual slavery narrative with his untenable labor
contract story. I will show in the next section how much his labor contract story conflicts with
facts.

Section 2: Critical Evaluations of Ramseyer’s Arguments about “Comfort
Women” as Voluntary Sex workers with Labor Contracts
In the spring of 2021, I tried to evaluate Ramseyer’s 2021 article in which he claimed that
Japanese and Korean “comfort women” were sex workers with labor contracts rather than sexual
slaves. In making such a bold claim, as noted above, he should have written at least a long serious
article. However, he devoted only 5.5 pages to the main body of his article. He made assertions
without using data as evidence to prove his arguments. This is a typical revisionist scholars’
method of writing articles and books. Ramseyer’s sources for his article are very one-sided. He
referenced four books by Takeshi Fujinaga—a major Japanese historical revisionist—as well as a
very controversial book by Yu-ha Park, a well-known Korean history denialist (see Y. H. Park
2013). In addition, an overwhelming majority of other cited works were the products of Japanese
or Korean historical revisionists. It is noteworthy that he completely failed to cite or mention two
key Japanese historians, Hayashi Hirofumi (2015) and Yoshiaki Yoshimi (2000), who discovered
hundreds of Japanese historical documents that demonstrated the Japanese military government’s
establishment and management of “comfort stations” and the forced mobilization of Asian
“comfort women.” Like other historical revisionists, he selectively used a few or several KCW’s
testimonies and generalized the findings to all other KCW.
Ramseyer provided two major arguments to support his claim that KCW were not forcibly
mobilized to JMB and were therefore not sexual slaves. First, he argued that “there were no
historical documents such as newspaper articles, police reports, and personal diaries that
demonstrated the forced mobilization of KCW (Ramseyer 2022, 19). Second, he claimed that he
could not accept the major findings based on testimonies of a small number of KCW who he claims
were under the control of Korean redress activists. I will show in this section that neither of
Ramseyer’s two major arguments is justifiable. In addition, I will also show based on KCW’s
testimonies that KCW were sexual slaves because they were brutally treated under custody at JMB
by the Japanese military.
1. The Evidence of Forced Mobilization based on Korean Daily Articles
Ramseyer’s first major argument against the forced mobilization of KCW to JMB is that
Korean redress activists and scholars emphasized the forced mobilization of KCW mainly based
on Seiji Yoshida’s discredited book (Ramseyer, 2022, 16-18, 19, 24, 26, 31). As well documented
by Yamaguchi in her book chapter (Yamaguchi, 2020) and her article in this special issue
(Yamaguchi, 2022), Japanese historical revisionists attacked Yoshida’s book (Yoshida, 1983) and
Asahi Shimbun that reported his articles for mainly contributing to disseminating the view of the
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forced mobilization of KCW to the United States and Korea. Read the following paragraph by
Ramseyer:
I am forced to analyze these oral testimonies, however, because as far as I can tell,
they constitute virtually the only evidence that the Japanese army dragooned
Korean women. This strikes me as deeply surprising. Had the Japanese military
kidnapped non-trivial numbers of young women at gunpoint, one would expect to
find contemporaneous corroboration. One would expect to read stories in
newspapers, police reports, and personal diaries. Instead, the accounts mostly
appear only in the wake of Yoshida’s (later proven to be) 1983 book (Ramseyer,
2022, 18-19).
He emphasized that “the post-war Korean newspapers did not discuss bayonet-point dragooning
under the Japanese occupation” (Ramseyer, 2022, 20).
However, as I clarified in my book in detail (2021, 36-37), major Korean newspaper
articles published in the post-war years indicated that the chongshindae (teishintai in Japanese,
meaning voluntary labor corps) or cheonyeogongchul (each Korean family devoting a young
daughter to Japan) was used as the mechanism of forcibly mobilizing young Korean girls and
women to JMB. These articles were published well before the Korean translation of Yoshida’s
book was available in 1989 (Yoshida, 1989). They were based on interviews with Korean drafted
soldiers and laborers who had met KCW at JMB or encountered them on their way home after the
end of the war. Through an online search of four major Korean newspapers, Veki Yoshikata (2015)
collected all articles published between 1945 and 1994 referring to the chongshindae used in the
context of sexual services to Japanese soldiers. She found that 2,815 articles were published during
the fifty-year period, with 2,652 articles published between 1945 and 1979 (before the beginning
of the redress movement). They clearly indicated that KCW were forcibly mobilized to JMB, and
that Koreans learned about it well before the redress movement started in the late 1980s.
I quote here three paragraphs from three separate newspaper or magazine articles because
Ramseyer devoted many pages to his claim that no newspaper article mentioned the forced
mobilization of KCW. In March 1964, Okamura Akihiko, a Japanese Southeastern Asian
correspondent of Pan-Asia News, contributed a three-part report on Japanese fisherman’s illegal
fishing activities in the South Korean maritime area to Dong-a Ilbo, a major Korean daily. He
quoted the Korean captain as making the following meaningful statement to him: “This is a
historical event all Japanese politicians know well now. You, young Japanese, would be better to
know how much Koreans suffered during the Japanese colonization period. Many Korean women,
18-20 years old, were dragged to Japanese military brothels in the name of the ‘chongshingdae’
and to serve Japanese soldiers as sex workers.” Okamura wrote: “I felt so ashamed to hear the
story that I could not look at him” (Okamura,1964). The Korean captain’s statement about many
young Korean women having been dragged away for sexual servitude to Japanese soldiers
indicates that many young Korean women’s forced draft to JMB was very much common
knowledge among people in Korea in the 1960s.
On the eve of Korean Independence Day in 1963, Geon-ho Song, the chief editor of
Kyunghyang Shinmun, published an article about Korean victims of Japan’s colonization of Korea.
He identified Koreans mobilized to the Japanese military as laborers, soldiers, and the
chongshindae as the three major groups of victims. He elaborated on the chongshindae:
The Japanese military forcibly mobilized young unmarried Korean girls in the name
of the chongshindae or cheanyeogongchul [devoting a daughter to the state] to
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devote them to Japanese soldiers as “comfort women.” The forced mobilization of
Korean girls and young women by the Japanese military government led to the
early marriage trend in Korea, as parents wanted to get their daughters married
quickly before they would lose them for cheonyeogongchul [devoting one daughter
to the state]. No one knows how many unmarried Korean girls were dragged to
Japanese military brothels and what happened to them (Song, 1963, 5).2
In the 1982 August issue of Lady KyeongHyang, a women’s magazine in Korea, Lee NamLim, a 55-year-old former KCW, wrote a four-page memoir in which she disclosed her identity as
a victim of the chongshindae for Japanese soldiers (N. Lee, 1982). In her memoir, entitled
“Japanese Soldiers Destroyed My Youth like This,” she accused Japanese soldiers of having
treated her brutally at a “comfort station” in Yanggun, Myanmar. She reported that the only reason
she did not commit suicide at the “comfort station” was that she could take revenge on the soldiers
after the war by telling the world about the Japanese military’s crime.
The above clarifications with three quotations from Korean newspaper and magazine
articles indicate that almost all Koreans knew in the post-war years that the Japanese military
forcibly mobilized many Korean girls and young women to JMB in the name of chongshindae or
cheonyeogongchul. The Japanese military government formally used the term chongshindae to
refer to a large number of Korean laborers mobilized in the 1944-1945 period, while they called
Asian women mobilized to JMB “comfort women.” However, when recruiting Korean women to
mobilize them to JMB, it did not use the term “comfort women,” but used the chongshindae or
cheonyogongchul probably to hide their mobilization to JMB. Thus, the Japanese military used the
term chongshindae or cheonyogongchul to forcibly mobilize both Korean women laborers and
Korean “comfort women.” In fact, when the Korean government made a hotline to ask Korean
chongshindae survivors to report to the Korean government in the early 1990s, both KCW
survivors and Korean forced women laborers came forward to report them (Chung 2016, 23).
Ramseyer seems to have learned that several newspaper articles referring to the
chongshindae were published in Korea in the 1980s (Ramseyer 202, 20). However, following the
lead of C. Sarah Soh (2008, 162, 165), he mistakenly interpreted the use of the term chongshindae
as only referring to Korean labor corps that “the Japanese government mobilized for industrial jobs
under the emergency mobilization program in the late 1944 and 1945.” However, as clarified in
the above paragraph, the Japanese military used the chongshindae to refer to Korean girls and
young women forcibly mobilized to JMB too. It seems to have used chongshindae to refer to
forcibly mobilized Korean girls and young women to JMB, instead of referring to “comfort
women,” mainly to hide the CWS. For this reason, Korean women’s leaders originally named its
organization the Chongshindae Daecheak Hyopeuihe (The Association for the Solution to the
Chongshindae Issue). Because of the association between the terms chongshindae and KCW,
Korean women’s leaders included the chongshindae in the name of their organization.
2. The Evidence of Forced Mobilization based on KCW’s Testimonies
In addition to Korean newspaper articles, my analysis of 103 KCW survivors’ testimonies
indicates that 25% of them mentioned the chongshindae or cheonyeogongchul to refer to their
forced mobilization to JMB (Min and Lee 2018). Twenty-five percent seems to be an undercount
because the interviewers did not ask this specific question. Due to space limitations, I quote only
one testimony here. After completing the fourth grade, her mother advised Kim Bok-dong to stay
at home to avoid being taken to a JMB. Two of her sisters got married at early ages to avoid being
2

I also used this quotation in my book (Min, 2021, 37).
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dragged away by Japanese officials. Since she was only 14 years old, she thought she would be
safe from being forcibly mobilized to JMB. However, one day something terrible happened to her.
Below is the excerpt from her narrative:
One day, our village head came to my house with a Japanese man in yellow
uniform…. He spoke Korean well. They said to my mother: “You have to devote
your daughter to teishintai. So, bring her here now. Don’t you think you have to
devote a daughter to the nation [Japan] as you do not have a son? If you don’t do it,
you are a traitor and you cannot live here.” When my mother asked them “What is
teishintai,” they replied. “They work in factories that make soldiers’ uniforms and
they can make money.” …. In this way, I was forced to follow them (B. D. Kim
1997, 85).3
“Teishintai” is the Japanese word for chongshindae. The above analyses convincingly
show that both the Koreans who lived during the Asian-Pacific War and those who lived in the
post-war years were well aware that the Japanese military forcibly mobilized Korean girls and
young women to JMB for sexual services to Japanese soldiers in the name of the chongshindae.
Accordingly, Ramseyer’s and other Japanese historical revisionists’ claim that Koreans learned of
Korean women’s forced mobilization to JMB only through Seiji Yoshida’s discredited book
available in Korea in 1989 is never justified. The main reason why the redress movement for the
victims of Japanese military sexual slavery started in the late 1980s was the elimination of South
Korea’s military dictatorship and the maturity of feminist organizations in Korea in the 1980s. It
had nothing to do with Yoshida’s discredited book.
Ramseyer, like other Japanese historical revisionists, has not accepted “comfort women’s”
testimonies as credible evidence for sexual slavery (Hata,2018; Ramseyer, 2022, 2, 3 & 17). But
the criminal justice system has considered victims’ testimonies as the central factor to determining
criminal judgements. In determining whether the CWS was sexual slavery or commercial
prostitution, the following two are key issues: (1) whether they were forcibly mobilized to
“comfort stations” or not; and (2) whether they were forced to sexually serve Japanese soldiers
under detention in JMB. As Yoshimi (2013, 41) aptly pointed out, the Japanese military is unlikely
to have left behind documents indicating that it mobilized Asian women by force to JMB, just as
criminals who kidnap innocent people do not keep records of their illegal action. In fact, the
Japanese military made every effort to eliminate historical records about the CWS by
communicating verbally as much as posible (Hayashi 2015, 51). It also tried to destroy as many
historical documents related to the CWS as possible. For these reasons, “comfort women’s”
testimonies are very important for determining whether the CWS was sexual slavery or not.
Another important reason why Ramseyer should accept “comfort women’s” testimonies as
credible evidence for Japanese military sexual slavery is that all governments, including the
Japanese government, and all international human rights organizations, have used the victims’
testimonies as the most important pieces of evidence. The Kono Statement, which acknowledged
the forced mobilization of “comfort women,” was based mainly on Japanese officials’ personal
interviews with KCW (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan1993), although it also used historical
documents. Moreover, the Shimonoseki Branch of the Yamaguchi District Court accepted the
forced mobilization of KCW based on three KCW plaintiffs’ testimonies (C. Kim ,1998).
Unlike Japanese historical revisionist politicians, human rights organizations accepted
KCW’s testimonies as credible evidence and determined that the CWS was indeed sexual slavery.
3
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In addition, the two most important resolutions to the Japanese government by major international
human rights organizations were made mainly based on their interviews with South Korean, North
Korean, or/and Filipino “comfort women’s” testimonies (Coomaraswamy, 1996; Dolgopal and
Paranjape, 1994). These human rights organizations concluded that the CWS was a perfect form
of sexual slavery, the term commonly used to refer to the CWS today. McDougall, another Special
Rapporteur of UN Human Rights Commission, used the terms “rape centers” to refer to JMB
(McDougall, 2015 [1997], 103). Although she did not include KCW’s testimonies in her report,
she visited Seoul a few times to communicate with KCW.
International human rights organizations, politicians, and college students not only
accepted comfort “women” survivors’ testimonies as credible evidence for sexual slavery, but also
enthusiastically accepted them because they had a human face. Before comfort women survivors
gave testimonies, no sexual victims had given open testimonies to the public. It is one of the
reasons why KOC’s testimonies were enthusiastically accepted by participants in their testimonies.
A very important issue is not whether we can use “comfort women’s” testimonies as
credible evidence or not, but whether the sample size of their testimonies is large enough to
generalize the findings to all “comfort women.” Fortunately, the Korean Council and the Korean
Research Institute on the Chongshindae (Korean Research Institute) conducted personal
interviews with 103 KCW and published them in eight volumes between 1993 and 2004. They
recruited several female volunteer professors, adjunct professors, and doctoral students who were
qualified to conduct audio-recorded personal interviews with each chosen KCW. They interviewed
those KCW who volunteered to participate in the project at their own homes. Each interviewer
contacted the same KCW four to six times at different time periods for the sake of accuracy and
consistency of information. As will be shown later, each personal interview group made an effort
not to hide any finding, even inconvenient findings, such as voluntary participation in “comfort
stations.” Given these facts, Ramseyer’s unfounded attack on the Korean Council for controlling
“who scholars and reporters will see and what the women will say” (Ramseyer, 2022, 21) is not
justified.
Moreover, 103 testimonies given by KCW constitute a sample large enough for statistical
analyses, as well as the largest sample among several sets of Asian “comfort women’s” testimonies.
Since every social group has a few or several deviant cases, we need to use the rule of the “majority”
or the “vast majority” as the important criteria for determining whether KCW were sexual slaves
or commercial sex workers. Eight volumes of the edited collections cover approximately 2,600
pages. Even if someone had read all eight volumes in their entirety, it would have been difficult to
understand the overall picture of KCW’s forced mobilization to “comfort stations” and their brutal
treatments without quantitative data included in tables.
Ramseyer rejected “comfort women’s” testimonies as credible evidence on the ground that
“these scholars rely too heavily on the statements from a small group of “comfort women” who
demanded compensation from Japan…” (Ramseyer, 2022, 23). He also said that “the hypernationalist version of what happened during this era on the Korean peninsula depends almost
entirely on a small set of autobiographies” (Ramseyer, 2022, 17). I would like to respond that
Ramseyer and other Japanese historical revisionists, rather than Korean redress activists, used a
few or several cases of KCW to deny the CWS as sexual slavery. I hope that he will accept the
major findings from my analyses of 103 KCW, a sample of KCW which is large enough, in this
article.
Another major problem of Ramseyer’s 2021 article and 2022 paper is that he failed to
differentiate between Japanese and Korean “comfort women,” as if they had been mobilized via
the same mechanism and treated at JMB in the same ways. According to my own and other scholars’
research, there were significant differences between Japanese and Korean “comfort women” in
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how they were mobilized, their ages at mobilization, fees that they were paid, and treatment that
they received at JMB. By lumping the two very different groups together, he greatly distorted and
misrepresented KCW’s mobilization to JMB and the brutal treatment they endured at the hands of
Japanese soldiers.
First of all, whereas most JCW originated from commercial prostitution houses in Japan
(Hayashi, 2015, 110), the vast majority of KCW were mobilized through forcible methods from
their homes, workplaces or outside, including employment fraud, helped by Japanese policemen,
soldiers, and military police officers who were stationed in Korea. Thus, his arguments
emphasizing commercial prostitution in the home country as the main source of “comfort women”
is not applicable to KCW, though his argument may be more applicable to JCW than to KCW. But
I also need to clearly point out that, as indicated by other scholars, both the recruitment of Japanese
girls and women to Japanese licensed prostitution houses (Onozawa, 2022; Yoshimi, 2022, 1-3)
and their subsequent mobilization to JMB (Hayashi, 2015, 115) were completely involuntary,
never involving mutually-agreed labor contracts as indicated by Ramseyer.
There are several indicators of brutality that KCW experienced in the mode of their
mobilization and their experiences in JMB. One important indicator is that most of them were
taken there at unbelievably young ages. The age difference between JCW and KCW is as important
as the mode of mobilization. As shown in Table 1 below, the vast majority of KCW were mobilized
at extremely young ages: 93% of the 103 KCW were mobilized between the ages of 11 and 20
(Min, 2021, 84), which was under the legal age of 21 for prostitution at that time, according to
Japanese law and three anti-trafficking international conventions Japan had joined (Yoshimi, 2000,
156). On the other hand, a vast majority of JCW were mobilized to “comfort stations” at age 21 or
older (Hayashi, 2015, 110). Ramseyer indicated that recruits would have been between 16 and 30
(Ramseyer, 2022, 13). KCW were recruited at much younger ages than JCW to which Ramseyer
seemed to have referred.
Table 14: Ages at which KCW were Mobilized to JMB
Ages
Number
%
11-12
8
8
13-15
29
28
16-20
59
57
21-27
7
7
Total
103
100
Sources: testimonies of 103 KCW in Korean Council 2001 & 2004; Korean Council and
Korean Research Institute 1993, 1997; Korean Council and Korean Research Institute,
1993, 2001a & 2001b; Korean Research Institute 2003; Korean Research Institute and
Korean Council 1995 &1999
Since 93% of KCW were under the legal age for becoming sex workers, almost all of them
should be considered as having been forcefully mobilized, regardless of their modes of
mobilization. According to three anti-traffic international treaties Japan joined respectively in 1904,
1910 and 1921 (Yoshimi 2000, 84), it was illegal to take underage girls 20 or younger for
prostitution, regardless of whether they agreed or not. Moreover, the finding that nearly all KCW
were mobilized before the legal age for commercial prostitution also proves the inadequacy of
Ramseyer’s and other Japanese scholars’ (Norma 2016) claim that KCW were mobilized mainly
from commercial prostitution houses, which was the case for most JCW.
4
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The Japanese military could not forcibly mobilize unmarried Japanese virgins to serve
Japanese soldiers because there would have been a strong negative reaction in Japanese society.
According to a historical document cited by Yoshimi, the Home Ministry’s Chief of the Police
Bureau stipulated that “the travel of women intending to engage in the shameful calling should be
limited to the women currently working as sex workers, at least 21 years of age, and free from
sexually transmitted and other infectious diseases” (Yoshimi, 2000, 100). Ramseyer indicated that
“the recruits would be between 16 and 30 years old,” but “most KCW were mobilized to JMB in
their twenties” (Ramseyer, 2022, 13). Ramseyer’s statement may be applicable to JCW, but not to
KCW.
Yoshimi cited another meaningful sentence from the same historical document: “If the
recruitment of these women and the regulation of [recruiting] agents is improper, it will not only
compromise the authority of the empire and damage the honor of the Imperial Army; it will exert
a baleful influence on citizens on the home front, especially on the families of soldiers who are
stationed overseas” (Yoshimi, 2000, 154). This indicates the Japanese military government’s
concern about losing the trust not only of the international world, but also of Japanese citizens—
especially Japanese soldiers—if it had mobilized Japanese virgins to JMB. These excerpts from
Yoshimi’s research also show that the Japanese military controlled the recruitment of “comfort
women.”
Moreover, these clarifications indicate that Ramseyer was negligent in his efforts to prove
that Korean and Japanese “comfort women” were sex workers with labor contracts, without
knowing the significant differences between the two groups. How could Korean girls and young
women between the ages of 11 and 20 have voluntarily participated in “comfort stations” to make
money? Since the chongshindae was associated with “comfort women” in Korea for many years,
Korean women leaders’ called their organization Chongshindae Munje Daechaik Hyeopuihe (The
Association for the Resolution of the Chongshindae Issue) in November 1990.
Ramseyer has consistently denied the fact that most KCW were forcibly mobilized to JMB
(Ramseyer, 2022, 3, 16), although he did not provide any evidence for his denial. He suggested
that many women in war zones (China and other Asian occupied territories) are likely to have been
dragged to JMB forcibly. But he strongly refused to accept the fact that most KCW were taken to
JMB by coercive methods (Ramseyer, 2022, 3). He strongly believes that the claim about the
forced mobilization of KCW largely started with Seiji Yoshida’s book which Hata (1999) proved
was fabricated. However, as already documented, Korean newspaper articles reported many stories
of Korean girls’ and young women’s forced mobilization to JMB in the post-war years. Since
social science knowledge is based on the rule of the majority or the vast majority, we need to
examine KCW’s testimonies in detail to determine whether most KCW or only a few or several
KCW were forcibly mobilized to JMB. I provide results of a data analysis of 106 cases of KCW’s
mobilization (three women mobilized twice) to JMB in Table 2 below.
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Table 25: Methods of KCW’s Mobilization to JMB
Methods of Mobilization
Number %
mobilization by coercion at home, work or someone else’s home

13

12

abducted or kidnapped outside of home

18

17

mobilized by a combination of employment fraud and coercion

16

15

employment fraud

39

37

sold by their parents and other relatives

14

13

voluntary or semi-voluntary participation

6

6

All

106

100

Testimonies of 103 KCW in Korean Council 2000a, 2000b & 2004; Korean Council and Korean
Research Institute, 1993 & 1997; Korean Research Institute, 19995 & 2003; Korean Research
Institute & Korean Council, 1999.
One hundred and six cases of mobilization (including three women who were mobilized
twice) indicate that a vast majority (81%) were mobilized through coercive methods (44%),
including kidnapping, abduction, being physically taken, or verbal threats or employment fraud
(37%), with 13% mobilized through parents’ sales of their daughters to others (mostly not directly
to “comfort stations”). Only four women volunteered in their first mobilization, with two of them
having volunteered in their second mobilization. Ramseyer indicated that many Koreans engaged
in recruiting KCW using employment fraud. However, the testimonies indicate that the Japanese
colonial government’s officials in Korea used Japanese soldiers, police officers, teachers, Korean
village heads, and other Korean recruiters in Korea. The forced mobilization of a huge number of
KCW was part of the manpower exploitation of the Korean colony by Japan. Hundreds of
thousands of other Korean women and men were forcibly mobilized as civilian workers while
another hundreds of thousands of Korean men forced into battle as soldiers (Kang and Suh, 1997).
It seems that Ramseyer’s definition of forced mobilization only applies to girls and young
women who were physically taken at gunpoint (Ramseyer, 2022, 4). He agreed that many KCW
were mobilized through employment fraud (Ramseyer, 2022, 3). However, like other Japanese
historical revisionists, he does not consider employment fraud to be a forcible technique. He
considers only the mobilization involving physical force and threats, but not deception, as forced
mobilization conflicts with both the social science use of the term and legal decisions. Hayashi
(2008) distinguished between a narrow and a broad definition of forced mobilization. First of all,
taking young women using deception to a “comfort station” was a violation of criminal law in
Japan at that time (Hayashi, 2015, 53). According to a historical document found by Etsuro
Totsuka, the Nagasaki local court gave an illegal verdict to a Japanese recruiter who took a
Japanese woman using deception to a “comfort station” in Shanghai in 1932 (Chung, 2016, 67).
Moreover, Shinzo Abe and other Japanese politicians consider many Japanese citizens sent to
North Korea through deception in the 1960s and 1970s as having been forcibly taken there against
their will (Hayashi, 2015,70).
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I introduce a few examples of a KCW coercively mobilized to a JMB. Kim Yong-Ja was
taken from her home to Manchuria by a Japanese police officer at the age of 16. She said that a
recruiter often came to her village with a police officer and checked every home to take unmarried
girls somewhere. One day, a police officer came to her home to take her:
At that time, I was very young and pretty, I was hiding at home so as not to get
caught, but the police officer kept beating my father to find me. He poured water
from a kettle into my father’s nose to make him release me. So, I told my father I
would go… Japanese police officers and soldiers visited all the houses in my village
to find unmarried girls and then took them. They said that they would give me
money, but they never gave money…. I heard my father was hospitalized and died
a few days after I left home (Young-Ja Kim, 2001,103).6
Most KCW encountered physical violence, rape, and other forms of brutality on their way
to JMB, regardless of their method of mobilization. Since Ramseyer may have never imagined the
brutality that KCW encountered en route to JMB, I provide two examples here. Kim Ui-gyeong
and about thirty other Korean women, mostly kidnapped, were put on a China-bound train and
encountered brutal treatments by Japanese soldiers. They put the women in a freight car of a train
reserved for transporting horses. Kim described what happened to them on their way to China:
The train suddenly stopped somewhere and many Japanese soldiers quickly moved
to the train and wildly opened the door of the freight car. There were about thirty
Korean women in the train. Japanese soldiers took all of us out of the train and tried
to rape us. When we resisted as much as possible, they threatened us with swords
and beat us with bayonets. My entire body was injured and blood-stained. A few
women tried to run away to escape from this unbearable atrocity and were shot to
death by Japanese soldiers. I only thought that I had been deceived to go there and
that I might not be able to stay alive there (Kim, EK, 2003, 319-320).7
The majority of KCW were taken to train stations in Japan, China, and the Pacific Islands
by ship from Busan to Shimonoseki or Hiroshima, and then to destinations elsewhere. When Yun
Soon-man, at the age of thirteen, was kidnapped by Japanese soldiers at her home with her aunt
and put in a military truck, she cried loudly, lying down inside the truck. The soldiers forcibly put
strong sleeping pills into her mouth and sealed it with a mask (Yun, S. M, 2004, 173-174). When
other Korean women found her in Osaka, she was almost unconscious and her tongue was
paralyzed. They poured water into her mouth to save her life.
3. Un-Owed Debts and No Payment of Fees for Sexual Services
Ramseyer’s assertions that all JCW and KCW received large advances with labor contracts
before their mobilization to JMB have three major problems. First, my analyses of the 103
testimonies reveal that only some of 19 KCW who were sold or voluntarily participated seem to
have received advance payments, with the vast majority of them having received no advance
payments. Moreover, none of them reported having received a labor contract. The fact that he did
not provide evidence for labor contracts, and that none of the 103 KCW reported having received
any labor contract before their mobilization indicate that his labor-contract claim was his own
6
7
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design to deny the sexual slavery thesis. He tried to deflect criticisms that there was no physical
evidence of labor contracts by saying that “the contracts seem not to have survived the war”
(Ramseyer 2022, 34). This excuse is not logically sound because the Japanese military would have
kept the document to show that the CWS was not sexual slavery, since the brothel owners ran
“comfort stations” under the control of the Japanese military. Moreover, Ramseyer’s claim that
“only the brothels and the women” had the contracts (Ramseyer, 2022, 12) has a serious empirical
problem. It is almost impossible that all KCW have lost the documents for their labor contracts at
JMB or on their return trips. Moreover, how is it possible that none of the 103 KCW mentioned
labor contracts in testimonies? It is impossible that all of them lost their memories of labor
contracts.
All KCW having received large advances before their mobilization means that they owned
debts amounting to the same advance payments to pay back to the owners of JMB. However, my
analyses of 103 KCW’s testimonies indicate that the owners of JMB charged un-owed debts to
most KCW illegally by charging them with expenses for their recruitment, transportation, and even
new clothing.
I introduce the following two KCW’s testimonies to show their illegal practice. Han GunJa recounted:
A Korean man in military unform took me to a Korean couple in Seoul. The couple
took me to a “comfort station” in Manchuria by train. When they arrived at the
“comfort station,” the female owner told me how much money she gave the two
Korean men for taking me to her and also how much money they spent for train
fares and the purchase of my clothes. They said that I should sell my body to pay
back my debts. They told me to work for three years at the “comfort station” to pay
back my debt (Ha Gun-Ja, 1995, 65).
Park Yeon-i’s following testimony also indicates that the owner included not only her
recruitment and transportation fees, but also cosmetic expenses in her debts. Moreover, she could
not disagree to the owner about her debts because she would beat her:
Although I worked very hard not to make the owner dislike me, I was paid nothing
for three years. Her calculation of my debts included all expenses for my
recruitment and transportation from my home village, and all expenses for my
living costs at the “comfort station,” including cosmetics. We were expected to
accept our debts that the owner calculated. Otherwise, she would have beaten us
(Park Yeon-I, 1997, 128-129).
If KCW had volunteered to participate in “comfort stations,” the owners could have
charged them expenses for their recruitment and transportation. But it was illegal for the owners
to have charged these forcibly mobilized women. The owners seem to have designed the un-owed
debt system to tie the women to “comfort stations” for a long period of time. The Japanese military
should have known of the owners’ illegal practice of charging un-owed debts to “comfort women.”
But the Japanese military may have approved of it because it gave the impression that “comfort
women” were charged with debts because they had been mobilized voluntarily or through sales by
their parents with major advances from the owners of “comfort stations.” This finding from
KCW’s testimonies is important because no scholar seems to have indicated the problem of the
un-owed debts issue, which is why I have put the term un-owed debts in bold. It also indirectly
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shows the inadequacy of Ramseyer’s claim that all KCW participated in “comfort stations” with
advance payments based on contracts.
My analyses of KCW’s testimonies also show the inadequacy of Ramseyer’s argument that
KCW made a lot of money at “comfort stations.” At JMB, only eight of 103 KCW were found to
have received 40% or more of fees paid by Japanese soldiers to the front desk only in the last stage
of their sexual servitude, mainly because they had been assigned to officers’ clubs (five) or houses
of prostitution (three) (Min, 2021, 110). However, the Japanese military established officers’ clubs
mainly to prevent high-ranking Japanese officers from using private prostitution houses (Hayashi,
2015, 117). The military seems to have arranged for JCW to work at officers’ clubs. A predominant
majority of “comfort women” working for officers’ clubs are likely to have been JCW (Kurahashi
and Keyser, 1994; Ueno, 2004, 101; Yoshimi, 2000, 101). Thus, more JCW were paid significant
portions of fees than KCW, which is another difference between the two groups. My statistical
analysis reveals that 64% of KCW reported that they were not paid any amount of money by the
owners of “comfort stations,” with 11% giving no information (Min 2021, 110). All KCW reported
that almost all Japanese officers paid them some tips, with many enlisted soldiers having paid
small amounts of tips. However, receiving tips has nothing to do with labor contracts.
Ramseyer misrepresented Mun Ok-ju’s testimony. He characterized Mun as a happy
woman who enjoyed her life at a “comfort station” and made a lot of money (Ramseyer, 2021, 6).
I believe that Ramseyer exaggerated Mun’s earnings and misrepresented her experiences as a
“comfort woman” by ignoring some of the brutality that she was subjected to. For example, she
narrowly escaped getting killed by a drunken Japanese officer by taking his sword and injuring
him. Moreover, she also attempted suicide by jumping from the second floor at her “comfort
station,” sustaining serious shoulder injuries (Mun, 1993, 160-161); these incidents are major life=
threatening events. She did not work at an officers’ club, but she was physically close to one. The
Japanese military seems to have treated high-ranking officers very well, giving them high salaries
and frequent parties to make them fight loyally for the Japanese empire. In testimonies, some KCW
disclosed that officers’ clubs organized frequent drinking parties. Mun was fluent in Japanese and
had musical talents. Thus, she was made to work as an entertainer at parties at night at an officer’s
club (Mun, 1993, 162). Drunken officers seem to have paid very generous tips to “comfort women.”
But, as pointed out above, these tips had no connection with labor contracts.
Ramseyer argued that we do not need to make a distinction between tips and fees that
“comfort women” received (Ramseyer, 2022, 37). It is an unacceptable argument to deflect the
main issue under consideration. Japanese soldiers paid tips whereas “comfort station” owners paid
fees to “comfort women” for their services to Japanese soldiers. To answer the question of whether
KCW were paid for their forced sexual services or not, we can only include formal fees they
received from “comfort station” owners. As already pointed out, only a very small proportion of
KCW (8%) received regular fees, but all Japanese officers and a small proportion of regular
Japanese soldiers paid tips to KCW. Ramseyer emphasized the labor contracts between “comfort
station” owners and “comfort women.” How then could he include tips in the fees?
Ramseyer emphasized that Ok-ju Mun had made a great amount of money at her “comfort
station.” However, because of the astronomically high inflation in Burma and other war-torn Asian
countries, what was over 25,000 yen in Rangoon, Burma in the 1943 was valued at 1,800 yen in
Japan in the December 1943 (Hayashi, 2015, 57; see also Yoshimi 2021, 16). Moreover, the
Japanese government did not allow KCW to withdraw money deposited in Japanese post office
accounts or banks during the war. When Mun visited Shimonoseki to testify in 1993, a Japanese
group tried to assist her in getting her deposit money back (H. Kim, 2007, 138). The group
identified Mun’s Japanese post office account and found that the balance had increased to 50,108
yen in the early 1990s (H. Kim, 2007,139).
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However, the post office refused to give the money to her on the grounds that she was no
longer a Japanese citizen after the 1952 Treaty of San Francisco, and that the 1965 Treaty on Basic
Relations covered all of the damages inflicted by Japan’s colonization of Korea. Japanese post
offices and banks refused to give back money to many other Korean civilian workers and soldiers
mobilized by the Japanese military government, but the Japanese government has refused to
disclose forcibly mobilized Koreans’ savings (Dong-A Ilbo, 1992). Deflecting to answer this
important question, Ramseyer said that “Mun seems to have had no trouble in getting the money
back if she had deposited in yen” (Ramseyer 2022, 51). Of course, all Korean forcibly mobilized
soldiers, workers and comfort women deposited savings in Japanese banks and post offices in yen.
4. Forced Sexual Services and Brutal Treatments under Tight Surveillance at JMB
While the above-mentioned points address a number of fallacies in Ramseyer’s argument
that the CWS was a contract-based prostitution system and not sexual slavery, I would like to
mention two final problems that make his position indefensible. In order to reject the sexual slavery
thesis, it is necessary to demonstrate that KCW provided sexual services for Japanese soldiers
voluntarily and could leave JMB when they wanted. However, testimonial data show that KCW
suffered brutal sexual violence under tight surveillance at JMB and were not allowed to freely
move.
First of all, I want to show that KCW encountered brutal sexual violence. As noted above,
the vast majority of KCW were mobilized to JMB as teenagers, most of whom had had no previous
sexual experience. Most of them may not have even started their menstrual cycles yet. Thus, most
of them suffered vaginal ruptures, severe pain, and/or excessive bleeding especially after their first
nights at JMB. According to my analysis of 103 testimonies, 61% of KCW suffered vaginal
ruptures, severe pain, or excessive bleeding, with 39% having become infertile (Min 2021, 129).
This is an undercount because several KCW women did not comment specifically on their sexual
activities. The sexual attacks on KCW during their first nights must have been a shocking
experience because the vast majority of them never expected to sexually serve Japanese soldiers.
Kang Mu-ja was forcibly taken to the Japanese military police warehouse in Masan, Korea
by a Japanese policeman and three Japanese military policemen. She was shipped to a Japanese
“comfort station.” She described being brutally gang-raped in her first encounter with Japanese
soldiers:
First, they stripped me naked, and then a few Japanese military officers with two
or three stars quickly rushed to me one by one for serial rapes. I became almost
unconscious. But they did not care whether I was dying or not. Their serial sexual
attacks burst my vagina, which led to heavy bleeding and pain. When I tried to
resist their sexual attacks, they tied my legs with my cotton belt so that I could not
run away. When the third guy could not start sex quickly, he put his finger into my
vagina. So, I kicked him a few times and he fell and hit his head on the floor. I
screamed, cursing them in Korean and saying, “I am a human being too!” Later,
five more soldiers raped me, and my nose and mouth started bleeding as well. My
entire body was almost paralyzed (Mu-ja Kang, 1997, 55).8
Ramseyer argued that “comfort women” could quit when they paid their advances
(Ramseyer, 2022, 49). As already pointed out, most KCW did not receive advances, but they were
charged with un-owed debts based on their recruitment and transportation fees. Moreover, only
8
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eight KCW were allowed to leave after paying off their debts, with four of them paid by themselves
and the other four paid by others (Min,2021,117). Byong-jik Ahn, a Korean professor, published
a book based on a Korean “comfort station” manager’s diaries (Ahn, 2013). In his book, he
suggested that not all “comfort women” were allowed to leave their JMB when they paid off debts,
and that “their ability to leave depended upon the demand for and supply of comfort women” (Ahn,
2013, 117). Tessa Morris-Suzuki supports Ahn’s suggestion based on a third-party interview about
a group of KCW in Burma: “But in fact, ‘owing to the war conditions, none of the women brought
by Kitamura was actually allowed to return home; ‘the one girl who fulfilled these conditions and
wished to return was easily persuaded to remain’” (Morris Suzuki, 2015, 9).
The small number of KCW who were allowed to leave JMB after payment of debts were
very lucky. Most KCW had been detained within “comfort stations” under tight supervision until
the end of the war. The Japanese military and the owners/managers of “comfort stations” kept a
close eye on the women and did not allow them to communicate with one another to prevent their
running away. They also warned the women that they would be severely punished if they were
caught trying to escape. Helped by an elderly Chinese laborer at the same “comfort station,” Jeong
Hak-su, a KCW, tried to escape. After changing her clothing in a private Chinese home during
dark night hours, she was escapting toward a mountain as directed by the Chinese elderly man
(Jeong, H. S.,1995, 162). She found two other Korean women who were escaping from another
“comfort station.” As the three women were running away together, Japanese soldiers chased after
them and threw a grenade toward them. Jeong said that she was injured on her left leg by a piece
of the grenade, while the other two women were killed. This is a brutal story that is radically
different from Ramseyer’s story of KCW voluntarily participating with labor contracts and being
able to leave “comfort stations” whenever they wanted.
The other strategy used to prevent escape was to show the women horrible scenes of
violence, such as Japanese solders gang-raping Chinese women and then killing them. Jeong Haksu’s testimony illustrates the atrocity of Japanese soldiers:
One day, the owner summoned all of us and took us to a garden in a factory in
Harbin. A little later, Japanese soldiers brought many Chinese women with their
hands tied. They stripped off the Chinese women’s clothing and tied each woman’s
legs and hands to a wooden panel. These cruel Japanese soldiers then raped the
Chinese women in different ways and interrogated them. Many soldiers lined up,
waiting for their turns to rape them. Spraying chili powder on their pubic areas and
stabbing their bodies with swords or knives, Japanese soldiers were enjoying
watching the women suffering from their brutal actions. Some soldiers spread
gasoline on their bodies to burn them (H. Jeong, 1995, 160).9
Jeong said that after witnessing these scenes, KCW no longer dared resist the Japanese
soldiers’ brutal treatment and had no choice but to remain at “comfort stations.” She did not say
in the testimony quoted above what crimes these Chinese women had committed. But another
testimony also indicates that Japanese soldiers showed KCW a similar scene of cruelly killing
Chinese soldiers for alleged espionage (J. Bae, 1997, 78-79). Thus, the Chinese women in Jeong’s
account seem to have played the role of spies to help Chinese soldiers secretly. The foregoing
analyses demonstrate that all KCW, regardless of how they were mobilized to JMB, were brutally
treated as sexual slaves with no freedom to leave as they wished. I wonder how Ramseyer can
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reconcile his argument for the freedom of KCW to leave JMB with Japanese soldiers’ brutal
treatments of KCW at JMB, used as a means of threatening them not to run away.
With no data or estimation provided, Ramseyer claimed that “There is no evidence that
there were 200,000 Korean comfort women. The number is somewhere around 5,000” (Ramseyer,
2020, 23). I agree that 200,000, a number that is frequently mentioned by scholars of “comfort
women” and redress activists, is likely exaggerated. But the Japanese government’s refusal to
release data related to the CWI is mainly responsible for scholars’ and redress activists’ use of
possibly inaccurate or exaggerated numbers.
I also would like to point out that Ramseyer’s suggested number of KCW (5,000) is much
smaller than the actual number. I estimate the total number of KCW was much larger than his
suggested number for the following reasons. First, a historical document analyzed by Yoshimi
(2000,108) indicates that the Kwangtung Army in Shanghai asked the governor-general of Korea
to round up 20,000 KCW in 1941 alone, but that only 8,000 Korean women were actually rounded
up and sent to Shanghai. The fact that the Japanese Army tried to round up such a large number of
Korean women in one year suggests that the number of total KCW mobilized to JMB between
1932 and 1945 was much larger than 5,000. Moreover, the historical document Yoshimi used also
suggests that the Japanese Army targeted women from Korea, its main colony, for the mobilization
of “comfort women.” Also, the 1937-1940 report shows that 51% of 14,755 Japanese soldiers in
China with a sexually transmitted disease (STD) had a Korean sexual partner, with 37% having a
Chinese partner, and 12% having a Japanese partner (Ibid., 94-95). These findings suggest that
KCW may have comprised the largest national group.
Ramseyer and other Japanese historical revisionists may have claimed that the number of
all KCW was small because all KCW survivors who came forward for testimonies in the 1990s
was relatively small (239 survivors in South Korea and approximately 150 survivors in North
Korea = 489). However, the number reflects a tiny fraction of total KCW mobilized. Almost all
KCW were assigned to JMB consisting predominantly of other Korean women. But all 103 KCW
survivors who responded to the personal narrative project were found to have stayed at different
“comfort stations.” This finding suggests (1) that a significant proportion of KCW may have died,
been killed, or committed suicide at JMB, (2) that the predominant majority of KCW survivors
seem to have had died before the early 1990s (remember that they were in their late sixties or early
seventies in the early 1990s), and that (3) some KCW survivors did not emerge to society
intentionally in the 1990s because of stigma attached to the victims of sexual violence.
My suggestions above are also partly based on the following facts. Many KCW survivors
stayed at “comfort stations” with large numbers of KCW, but their testimonies indicate that they
were the only KCW survivor from each “comfort station” in the early 1990s when they reported
to the Korean government. For example, Yun Duri in Busan, South Korea was sent to a “comfort
station” located in the same city (Yun, Du-ri, 1993, 288-289). She reported that the “comfort
station” had 45 “comfort women,” all Korean women. But no other KCW survivor who reported
to the Korean government in the 1990s was found to have stayed at the same “comfort station.”
My suggestions above are also partly based on historical data and fieldwork showing that many
KCW were stationed in Okinawa and its adjacent islands (H.S. Lee, 1992, 393), but no KCW who
stayed there reported to the Korean government. 10 Also, a research team from Seoul National
University Human Rights Center reported based on U.S. military documents in December 2017
that it discovered the names and photos of 26 KCW who suffered sexual servitude at “comfort
stations” in the Chuuk Islands in Micronesia (D. Park, 2017). The 26 KCW were on the list of
people who took a repatriation ship to Japan and Korea, but only one of those women reported to
10

Pong-gi Pae was the only KCW survivor who was forcibly mobilized to a JMB in Okinawa and trapped there after
the end of the war. See Fumaki Kawad, 1992.
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the Korean government in the 1990s. The other women are believed to have died before the early
1990s.

Critiques of Ramseyer in Connection with the Redress Movement
This section is divided into four subsections. The first subsection focuses on Ramseyer’s
unjustified attacks on the Korean Council & its redress activities. The second section looks at the
Japanese government and historical revisionists’ engagement in “history wars” in the 2010s and
its influence on Ramseyer. The third section focuses on the increase in right-wing history denialists’
organizations in South Korea during recent years.
1. Ramseyer’s Unjustified attacks on the Korean Council and Its Redress Activities.
Ramseyer made severe attacks on the Korean Council and its redress activities. Read his
following paragraph:
One organization lies in the heart of the current dispute with Japan; unfortunately,
it is an organization that manipulates the dispute in relentless opposition to
reconciliation with Japan. The organization was long known as the Chong Dae
Hyup (CDH), the Korean Council for Women Drafted for Military Sexual
Slavery…. It pressured the former comfort women to reject compensation offered
by Japan…. It brutally attacks scholars who would question the “sex slave”
narrative so passionately embraced by scholars in the West… And it has long been
headed by Yoon Mi-hyang … CDH controls most of the public testimony by the
comfort women. It maintains its ability to do so by collaborating in the operation
of a nursing home—the House of Nanumu—for the women who recount the stories
it wants told (Soh, 2008, 96). As political scientists Joseph Yi (2018) put it, the
prevailing narratives of abductions is based on the oral testimonies of a small
number of women (16 of 238 registered survivors), associated with activist
organizations (e.g. House of Sharing [e.g. nursing home]; Korean Council [i,e.,
CDH] (Yi, 2018). By helping to control Nanumu, CDH who scholars and reporters
will see and what the women will say (Ramseyer, 2022, 21).
In order to criticize the Korean Council and its redress activities adequately, Ramseyer
needs to conduct research on them. The above paragraph shows his ignorance of the Korean
Council’s major redress activities and the women leaders who have led the organization. He
mischaracterizes both the organization and its redress activities. I make a critical comment on the
second paragraph first. The Korean Council and the House of Sharing are two separate redress
organizations. While the Korean Council focuses on redress activities, the House of Sharing is the
place of residence for several (8-12) KCW. But both organizations separately took one or two
KCW to give public testimonies in Japan, the United States, and international human rights
organizations in the 1990s and the 2000s. There are three other redress organizations located
outside of Seoul, and one located in Daegu also separately sent a KCW, usually Lee Yong-su, to
Japan and the United States for public testimonies. Accordingly, there is no way that the Korean
Council controlled KCW’s public testimonies. Scholars and reporters contacted each organization
for personal interviews or to make documentary films. Ramseyer cited Joseph Yi, a Korean
historical revisionist, to support his argument. But Yi is one of most active Korean historical
revisionists who maintains a close relationship with him (Yi 2019).
As already pointed out in the previous section, the Korean Council and Korean Research
Institute, its sister research organization, published eight edited volumes of 103 personal
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narratives between 1993 and 2004. But neither organization controlled the oral testimonies. Both
organizations depended upon more than a dozen voluntary women faculty members to complete
each volume of their oral testimonies. Each volunteer researcher visited only one KCW’s home
and conducted a personal-narrative interview four to six times for each woman. There is no way
the Korean Council controlled the contents of “comfort women’s” personal narratives. To reiterate,
the eight volumes include 103 KCW’s personal narratives. This is the largest collection of
“comfort women’s” personal narratives collected in Asian countries. Given the fact of 103 KCW’s
personal narratives, Joseph Yi’s claim that the Korean Council collected only 16 KCW’s personal
narratives is false.
Ramseyer seems to know only Mee-hyang Yoon associated with the Korean Council. But
thirty-seven major women’s organizations in South Korea collectively established the organization
in November 1990 to formally start the redress movement. Its key leaders in the 1990s and 2000s
included four professors (Chung-ok Yun, Hyo-chae Lee, Chin-sung Chung, and Hei-soo Shin)
who had received Ph.D. degrees from U.S. universities and who were fluent in English and
Japanese. Chung-ok Yun, its founder, felt guilty about KCW because she had been able to avoid
forced mobilization to a JMB by virtue of her parents’ much higher class-background. As a result,
she began to conduct fieldwork in Japan at her own expense at the age of 55. By virtue of their
fluency in English, the aforementioned professors were effectively able to spread awareness of the
CWI and persuade people in the United States and several international human rights organizations
to put pressure on the Japanese government. The Korean Council has had a dozen board members
consisting of Korean women’s movement leaders who focused on getting donations from Korean
citizens. Moreover, it had a sister organization, the Korean Research Institute for the
Chongshindae (Research Institute), consisting of professors and adjunct professors of history and
social sciences until the mid-2010s. The members focused on conducting research on the CWI,
locating KCW trapped in China and the Pacific Islands, and helping them return to Korea. They
also provided services to KCW by visiting each regularly.
Ramseyer criticized the Korean Council for having rejected the Asian Women’s Fund, in
the following paragraph: “CDH made its threats against the women credible when Japan first
offered compensation in 1995. Determined to sabotage the coming reproachment, it ordered the
women to refuse the payments. Some took the money anyway” (Ramseyer, 2022. 22). This
criticism mischaracterizes what happened in connection with the Korean Council’s effort to reject
the Asian Women’s Fund. To rectify his mischaracterization, I provide a clarification below.
First of all, Ramseyer’s consideration of the Japanese government’s plan to use the $20,000
compensation based on Japanese citizens’ donations (the AWF) to resolve the CWI as its sincere
effort to achieve “reconciliation” between Japan and other Asian victim countries is dead wrong.
All Asian redress organizations and major international human rights organizations rejected the
AWF as a solution to resolve the CWI. For reconciliation between Japan and other Asian victim
countries, the Japanese government needs to acknowledge the CWS as sexual slavery and make a
sincere apology and compensation using the government’s fund. As a professor at a prominent law
school, Ramseyer should have known these requirements for the formal solution to the CWI.
International human rights organizations gave the Japanese government the following six
requirements to resolve the CWI: (1) reveal details about the “comfort women” system through an
investigation, (2) acknowledge the “comfort women” system as sexual slavery, (3) make a sincere
apology to the victims, (4) compensate the victims (using its state fund), (5) include information
about sexual slavery in Japanese history textbooks and install “comfort women” memorials in
Japan, and (6) punish Japanese soldiers and officials responsible for the establishment of “comfort
stations.” The Japanese government could have resolved the CWI honorably in the latter half of
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the 1990s if it had met three of the requirements (2,3, and 4). But the AWF did not meet any of
these requirements.
In the paragraph cited above, Ramseyer criticized members of the Korean Council for
having used threats to KCW to prevent them from receiving money from the AWF. Again, this
accusation has no basis. Staff members of the Korean Council tried to teach KCW about the
importance of the Japanese government’s acknowledgment of the CWS as sexual slavery, a sincere
apology and compensation to resolve the issue. But it was difficult to teach them partly because of
their lack of formal education (only 7% completed elementary school) and partly because of their
long years of poverty. Thus, it was quite natural that the compensation money of $20,000 was very
attractive to most of them. Moreover, despite the adamant opposition of staff members of the
Korean Council and many international human rights organizations, Japanese leaders of the AWF
11 sent officials in January 1997 to KCW’s homes to persuade them to accept the compensation
money. On January 11,1997, staff members of the AWF in Korea announced that seven KCW had
received $20,000 from the AWF secretly (C. Chung, 2016: 206). By announcing the news about
the reception of the AWF by these women but not disclosing their names, Japanese officials further
encouraged other KCW to accept the AWF. Naturally, the staff members of the Korean Council
were angry about Japanese officials who had designed this inadequate solution and tried to drive
a wedge between the redress organization and KCW. The Korean Council contacted KCW and
tried to persuade them not to accept it, but never threatened any of them, as Ramseyer claimed.
Thus, it was the AWF, rather than the Korean Council, that was responsible for the tension and
conflict created between the Korean Council and some KCW.
In 1997, the Korean Council persuaded Kim Dae-jung, a presidential candidate of South
Korea, to pay each surviving KCW about $20,000 using the government fund when he would be
elected president so that they did not have to accept the “charity money” from the AWF. As
expected, Kim was elected president in early 1998. His administration paid about $20,000 to each
KCW survivor, with the exception of those seven women who had already received the amount
from the AWF secretary. When KCW received $20,000 from the Korean government, they signed
to make sure they would not receive another $20,000 from the AWF. However, the AWF released
data, indicating that the 61 KCW had received $20,000 from the AWF as of 2007 (Wada, 2015,
221). This means that altogether, 68 (42%) of the 163 KCW eligible for the compensation in 1997
received it from the AWF. The Korean Council never investigated who had received the AWF
after receiving the same amount from the Korean government. The AWF officials made great
efforts to ensure that nearly all KCW accepted the compensation money for ten years (1997-2007)
so that they could make the claim that they formally resolved the issue with compensation to the
victims, but the majority of KCW refused the compensation money.
In the process of rejecting the AWF, many KCW were transformed from victims into
activists. The foregoing clarification indicates the inadequacy of Ramseyer’s claim that members
of the Korean Council controlled KCW with threats to prevent them from accepting AWF. It also
shows the inadequacy of Ramseyer’s claim that the Korean Council neglected the welfare of KCW
by preventing them from receiving the AWF. In addition, the foregoing analysis also indicates that
Moto’s (2018) claim cited by Ramseyer (2022: 21) that “several comfort women sued CDH to try
to retake control over their movement” is nonsense.
Despite Ramseyer’s emphasis on their conflicts over the AWF, staff members of the
Korean Council helped many KCW transform from the victims of sexual slavery into activists.
The frequent interactions of key staff members of the Korean Council and several key KCW
activists with influential women’s human rights activists at international meetings, conferences,
11

The AWF indicates both the $20,000 fund and the Japanese organization that created and managed the fund.
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and hearings helped them recognize that sexual violence during wartime is an important women’s
human rights issue (Min, 2021, 180). They came to learn the tragic stories of huge numbers of
women who were victims of rape, torture, and murder during wars in Bosnia, Rwanda, Congo, and
other countries (M. Yoon, 2016, 237-24). On March 8, 2012, Kim Bok-dong and Gil Won-ok, two
key KCW activists, held a press conference to announce their proposal to start the Butterfly Fund.
Yoon quoted the following comments by Gil at the press conference:
It is unimaginably difficult for children to understand it. I was taken to a battlefield
at the age of 13 and I am now 85 years old. I lived for 72 years with pain. But we
have learned that many women in other countries are still suffering from sexual
violence in war zones as we did. If we receive reparations from the Japanese
government, we will use the money to establish the Butterfly Fund to help the
victims of sexual violence (quoted from M. Yoon 2016, 266).
They called it the Butterfly Fund to emphasize their wish for all women to fly like a butterfly, free
from discrimination, oppression, and violence. Although Gil did not complete elementary school,
she offered her comment like a well-educated activist.
The news about the Butterfly Fund moved the hearts of many Koreans. Many Koreans,
including a famous singer, immediately donated money for the fund (Ibid., 268). The Korean
Council began to send money in the name of the Butterfly Fund to an advocacy organization for
the victims of sexual violence in Congo in March 2012. Many women in Congo were subjected to
rape and other forms of violence by enemy soldiers in the twenty-year war that ended in 2013
(Caste and Kippenberg, 2002). The Korean Council has regularly sent money to support the child
victims of sexual violence in Congo. It also sent a team to Congo in 2014 to visit organizations
that support the victims and their children with a fund and a message of peace (M.H. Yoon, 2016,
237-245). Kim Bok-dong donated $50,000 to the fund in 2015. I have added the Butterfly Fund
story here to let Ramseyer understand that the main goal of the Korean Council is not to help KCW
get the compensation money from Japan, but to make the Japanese government acknowledge the
crime of sexual slavery and sincerely apologize to the victims to bring justice and dignity to them,
In the above and other paragraphs (Ramseyer, 2022, 28), Ramseyer depicted the Korean
Council as the most anti-Japanese organization. Of course, as the most important redress
organization in Asian countries, it has pushed the Japanese government very hard to acknowledge
the CWS as sexual slavery and to accept other responsibilities recommended by international
human rights organizations. However, criticizing the Japanese government and putting pressure
on it, which is the main role of the organization, does not mean that it has engaged in anti-Japanese
activities. The organization has closely coordinated with many Japanese citizens and Japanese
civic groups over a thirty-year period of redress activities. Since Ramseyer considered the CWI
mainly as a political conflict between Japan and Korea rather than as an important women’s human
rights issue, he has labelled any redress activities, including those in the United States, as antiJapanese.
I would like to remind Ramseyer that many Japanese citizens and civic organizations have
strongly supported the redress movement. In fact, there was more support in Japan than in Korea
in the early days of the redress movement. I introduce here some prominent cases of individual
and organizational support for the redress movement in Japan that moved my and other Korean
citizens’ hearts (Min, 2020). For example, many Japanese women and women’s organizations
donated large amounts of money or collected donations from others for the construction of the War
and Women’s Human Rights Museum established in 2012 by the Korean Council. They include
an elderly Japanese woman who donated half of her property she had inherited from her parents
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and entered a nursing home, and a retired Japanese school teacher who donated half of her pension
money (Korean Council, 2014, 256). Also, a group of approximately 500 Japanese citizens
collected nearly six million yen to help the House of Sharing construct the Historical Museum of
Japanese Military Comfort Women in the 1990s (Min, 2021, 75). Hirofumi Hayashi, a professor
of politics and peace studies at Kanto Gakuin University in Yokohama, helped the Korean Council
with data and the House of Sharing with a donation for the construction of the historical museum.
He also organized field trips for his students to the House of Sharing almost every year before
2017 (Min 2021, 211). Many Japanese lawyers helped the Council in international matters in the
1990s. In particular, Etsuro Totsuka spent almost ten years (most of the 1990s) in explaining to
the UN Commission on Human Rights the “comfort women” system’s violations of many UN
human rights regulations and international treaties (Totsuka, 1999). Also, many Japanese lawyers
individually helped Asian redress organizations and “comfort women” make lawsuits against the
Japanese government. Finally, whenever I participated in the weekly Wednesday demonstration
held in front of the Embassy of Japan in Seoul, I witnessed a few or several Japanese citizens
participating in it to support the redress movement.
There are many Japanese organizations that have led the redress movement independently
and/or helped the Korean Council in Japan. I introduce here only major organizations. The Center
for Research and Documentation on Japan’s War Responsibility (JWRC) has been the most
important Japanese redress organization for the victims of Japanese military sexual slavery. It has
been led by two major Japanese “comfort women” scholars, Yoshiaki Yoshimi and Hirofumi
Hayashi. But the members include many other lawyers, writers, and scholars. As the name of the
organization indicates, its main goal has been to disclose historical facts related not only to
Japanese military sexual slavery, but also to the Japanese military’s use of chemical weapons
against civilians in China. JWRC often published responses to the Japanese government’s denials
of responsibility for sexual slavery. Another important Japanese organization that supported the
Korean Council’s international activities was the Japan Federation of Bar Associations (JFBA).
The Korean Council wanted to take the sexual slavery issue to the CPA (the Court of Permanent
Arbitration) at the end of 1994 to find out whether the Japanese government was legally
responsible for the “comfort women” issue or not. JFBA tried to persuade the Japanese government
to accept international arbitration from this court. More than 70 Japanese lawyers and 55 Korean
lawyers made a team and were preparing to defend the Korean Council’s position (Min 2021, 212).
But the Japanese government rejected the idea of international arbitration apparently because it
was likely to lose in the arbitration. Violence Against Women in War Network (VAWW-NET
Japan) was a major Japanese women’s organization established in 1998 by Yayori Matsui, a late
prominent Japanese women’s activist. Its major achievement for the redress movement was a
proposal for the Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal on Japanese Military Sexual Slavery
(JMSS) and a successful completion of it, along with the Korean Council, in December 2000.
As summarized in the above paragraphs, many Japanese citizens and redress organizations
actively participated in the redress movement and took actions to put pressure on the Japanese
government mainly because, like members of the Korean Council, they considered JMSS as a
major women’s human rights issue and partly because they may have felt guilty as citizens of the
perpetrating country. They made Japan internationally honorable by acknowledging the Japanese
military’s historical crimes and tried to take actions to bring justice and dignity to other Asian
victims. I wonder if Ramseyer would consider these Japanese redress activists, like members of
the Korean Council, as anti-Japanese activists.
Ramseyer’s paper showed his tendency to label Mi-hyang Yoon, the Korean Council, and
its other members as communists, leftists, or North Korean connections (Ramseyer 2022, 17, 21,
22, & 28). In his online address given to enthusiastic members of a young Japanese neo-nationalist
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internet organization in April 2021, “he referred to his critics as Stalinists and accused humanities
in the United States of harboring anti-Japanese bias” (Curtis,2021, 4). His tendency to label
progressive “comfort women” scholars and activists as political leftists makes his article and
papers unacademic. Moreover, it seems to unconsciously reflect his strong linkages to Japanese
neo-nationalist organizations. His tendency to label “comfort women” scholars and redress
activists as nationalists, communists, or leftists is unlikely to promote tolerance, which he accused
Koreans of lacking
5. Emergence and Acceleration of the History Denialist Movement in Japan
The mid-1990s (1993-1995) was the best period in Japan during which the Japanese
coalition government was willing to resolve the CWI honorably by acknowledging the forced
mobilization of Asian “comfort women.” But the emergence of strong historical revisionist
organizations and the Liberal Democratic Party’s consolidation of power since the latter half of
the 1990s has contributed to the rejection of the Japanese government and right-wing Japanese
historical revisionists to acknowledge Japanese military sexual slavery. The first strong Japanese
historical revisionist organization was the Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform
established in January 1997. Its leaders were Nobukatsu Fujioka, Kobayashi Yoshinori, Kanji
Nishino and Ikihuko Hata. They established the central principles of the right-wing Japanese
historical denialism through their influential books and activities.
Since Ramseyer’s arguments for “comfort women” as commercial sex workers with labor
contracts are very similar to Japanese historical revisionist’s arguments, I introduce here key
arguments included in a very popular book written by Nobutkasu Fugioka and his associates (key
Japanese historical revisionists). They gave the following arguments about the CWI in their twovolume book:
(1) There was no evidence that the Japanese military forcibly mobilized “comfort
women,” as JMBs were privately run;
(2) it was unfair to single out the Japanese military prostitution system when other
countries and Japanese society used essentially the same system during World War
II;
(3) taxpayers’ money was being used to lead Japanese students to feel ashamed of their
ancestors and their being Japanese; and
(4) history textbooks included information about the CWI mainly because of “media
pressure” (Fujioka, et. al.,1996, 25-29).
With no data provided, they claimed that a woman’s income at a “comfort station” was on average
three times as much as she could earn at a house of prostitution, and that she earned a hundred
times more than a regular soldier could make at the time (ibid, p.39). But the main fallacy of their
claims is that they have to write their history in such a way that students feel proud of it and being
Japanese. It means that Japanese revisionist historians can distort facts to write their view of history.
Nevertheless, Hein and Seldon (2000) indicated that the above two volumes of the book became
two of the top ten best sellers in Japan at the time of publication.
Japanese diplomats and historical revisionist leaders were irritated by an increasing number
of Korean “comfort women” memorials installed in public places and the sexual slavery story
included in history textbooks in the United States in the early 2010s. They made all efforts to block
constructing “comfort women” memorials and including the “comfort women” slavery story in
media, history textbooks and school curricula. Nevertheless, their historical revisionist
interventions in the United States suffered legal and academic defeats (Phyllis Kim, 2020;
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Mirkinson, 2020; Yamagutch 2020, 243-258). Sankei Shimbun, the most conservative Japanese
daily, called the United States the main battlefield of “history wars.”
In her article in this special issue, Yamaguchi indicates that the Japanese government
increased the budget for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to 70 billion yen in 2015 to strengthen
“strategic communications.” “Strategic communications” mean Japanese diplomats correcting
wrong information about Japan and Japanese history in foreign media and books. The main
problem of “strategic communications” is that Japanese diplomats have tried to impose their views
of Japanese historical or territorial issues, such as the CWI and Nanjing Massacre without checking
facts. When Shinjo Abe or Japanese diplomats complained about the installment of a Korean
“comfort women” memorial in the United Stated, they usually started their complaints with the
statement, “Japanese military sexual slavery conflicts with ‘our stance.’” “Our “stance” means our
view or position, which conflicts with a widely accepted view of the CWS as sexual slavery.
Yamaguchi points out that “strategic communications” also include “expanding the circle
of people with a great ability toward or knowledge of Japan, especially scholars, journalists and
politicians outside of Japan, and that Ramseyer was considered an ideal person in this category. In
particular, Japanese right-wingers were concerned about the lack of academic books and peerreviewed articles in English published through prestigious publishers or journals that reflect their
positions. These considerations seem to have helped Ramseyer win the “Order of the Rising Sun
Award” for his “extensive contributions to the development of Japanese studies in the U.S.” from
the Consul-General of Japan in Boston in 2018. In addition, Yamaguchi informs us that for the
purpose of “strategic communications” the Japanese government wants Japan-friendly scholars to
promote its view of history, denying that the CWS was a system of sexual slavery.
The background information summarized above indicates that Ramseyer tried to defend
the position of the Japanese historical denialist through a 2021 journal article and papers posted at
the Harvard Law School website since 2020, In fact, he seems to have reproduced crude historical
revisionist arguments with no supporting data, by mischaracterizing progressive scholars’
arguments and citing Japanese and Korean historical revisionist works to support his arguments.
He seems to have tried to camouflage his crude historical revisionist arguments with the game
theory of “economic rationality”. He has been trying to play a leading role in propagating Japanese
historical-revisionist stories since 2020 through the academic venue in the U.S. East Coast in order
to recover the continuous defeats of Japanese history denialists in the “history wars” in other parts
of the United States in previous years.
Finally, I would like to make critical comments on Ramseyer’s repeated criticisms of the
defamation law in Korea in the name of “academic freedom,” “free speech,” “tolerance,” and
“diversity” (Ramseyer 2022: 1, 6, 23, 28). He has misused the concepts of academic freedom or
academic intolerance. Yong-Sik Lee (Y. Lee 2022, 8) clarified the difference between exercising
academic freedom and defaming “comfort women” victims succinctly in the following sentences:
Academic freedom may protect differences in opinion, but not in a fraudulent
manner in which the author omits or distorts material evidence just to make his
point to readers who may not possess a comparable level of knowledge of the matter
and consequently may be misled into accepting his arguments. This goes to the
question of his academic integrity.
To maintain his academic integrity, Ramseyer should have started his article with a
comprehensive review of the literature that interpreted the CWS as sexual slavery. He should then
have tried to write an article showing his data that did not fully support the sexual slavery
interpretation. He pretended that the main objective of his article was to explain the processes in
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which “comfort station” owners and “comfort women” agreed on labor contracts using game
theory. However, by titling his article “Contracting for Sex in the Pacific War,” he intended mainly
to propagate the historical revisionists’ thesis of “comfort women” as commercial sex workers
without providing relevant data. He has no right to defame KCW by treating them as commercial
sex workers, especially because several international human rights organizations had already made
the judgement that the CWS was sexual slavery.
2. The Increase in History Denialist Groups in Korea during Recent Years
In the final section of his article, Sung Hyun Kang pointed out that Young-hoon Lee, a
long-time right-wing Korean professor, and his associates published a book (Y. Lee, 2019) which
gained a great popularity. The book, translated into English, Anti-Japanese Tribalism, represent
historical denialists’ views similar to Ramseyer’s. According to Kang, the book ignited the rightwing movement in Korea. He reported that about 100,000 copies of the book were sold in Korea,
with 400,000 copies sold in Japan. The main theme of the book is that “Koreans express tribal
hostility toward neighboring Japan.” Younghoon Lee, the main author of the book, and several
other Korean scholars, such as Seok-choon Lew and Yu-ha Park, have rejected the Japanese
colonial exploitation thesis and the sexual slavery narrative since the early 2000s. But the number
of Korean scholars who accept the history denialism has increased during recent years. Moreover,
Anti-Japanese Statue Truth Investigation Committee tried to block the Korean Council’s
Wednesday demonstrations with the poster “Comfort Women Statue! Stop Wednesday
Demonstrations.”
Their right-wing pro-Japanese stance in Korea seems to have been strengthened in their
collective activities, with the number of its members having increased, during recent years by the
following three factors. First, a gradual disappearance of KCW’s redress activities due to their old
ages has weakened the redress movement in Korea and other countries. 12 Both Japanese and
Korean right-wing historical denialists seem to have anxiously waited for the disappearance of
KCW’s demonstrations in front of the Embassy of Japan and their other public testimonial
activities. Second, as indicated by Kang in his paper, new media technology and the influence of
online platforms have also immensely contributed to the emergence and strengthening of the antiredress movement in South Korea. In addition, as Judith Mirkinson aptly pointed out in another
article in this special issue, the emergence of right-wing nationalist governments and organizations
in many countries is a global trend in the 2020s.
Despite the great popularity of Lee’s book in Korea and Japan, I believe its main theme
never accurately locates the major contributing factors to the strong redress movement for the
victims of JMSS in Korea. The Korean Council started the redress movement in 1990 and has
waged a strong information war against the Japanese government for over 30 years between the
1990s and 2010s. However, the redress movement in other Asian victim countries, such as China
and the Philippines, the other two major Asian victim countries with large numbers of “comfort
women,” have been relatively weak in the redress movement. 13 Given this, we can understand why

12

As of August 2022, there are only 12 KCW survivors. Since all of them are in their nineties, none of them can
participate in the Wednesday demonstration.
13

As a measure, more than 120 “comfort girl” statues and “comfort women” memorials have been installed in
Korea. They include two Korean girl statues installed in front of Japanese diplomatic buildings (one installed in
front of the Embassy of Japan in Seoul and the other installed in front of the Japanese Consulate General in Busan).
In contrast, there is only a “comfort girl” statue installed in China (in Shanghai) in 2016. Only one “comfort
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the right-wing Japanese government and history denialists felt stressed by the Korean Council’s
relentless redress activities in their effort to conceal the crime of sexual slavery. The majority of
Koreans had supported the redress movement led by the Korean Council in terms of their
participation in donation campaigns and Wednesday demonstrations until the late 2010s. They
supported it partly because of their consideration of the CWI as an important women’s human
rights issue and partly because of their nationalist sentiment connected with Japan’s colonization
of Korea. We can detect some form of the nationalist motivation in their support of the redress
movement. But it is not the right-wing aggressive nationalism associated with Japanese history
denialists, but defensive nationalism. Since the forced mobilization of a large number of Korean
girls and young women was part of their suffering during the colonization period (Min, 2003), it
is quite natural that both staff members of the Korean Council and Korean citizens have strongly
supported the redress movement partly from their nationalistic motivation. Defensive nationalists
pay special attention to unresolved historical issues, but they are not antagonistic to neighboring
countries. Given my clarification of “defensive nationalism,” Lee’s interpretation of Koreans’
redress activities to bring justice and dignity to the victims of JMSS as Koreans’ expression of
“tribal hostility toward neighboring Japan” does not make any sense. Neither Korean Council
members’ redress activities nor Korean citizens’ support of the movement reflects their “tribal
hostility toward neighboring Japan.” We can detect from their activities only their concern with
gender justice and defensive nationalism.
The emergence of pro-Japanese right-wing historical denialist scholars and organizations
in Korea have strengthened the power of Japanese neo-nationalist history denialists, especially
Ramseyer in the United States. Ramseyer and Korean right-wing history denialists have helped
each other academically through what Kang called “circular citations.” Moreover, Kang’s paper
indicates that the Anti-Japanese Statue Committee and authors of Anti-Japanese Tribalism
announced a co-statement in support of Ramseyer on February 9, 2021. The statement argued that
“Ramseyer’s paper has been recognized for its originality and approved for publication through
peer-review at an international journal,” but [that] “a non-academic external force has disrupted
academic discussion….” (Kang 2022). Yamaguchi’s article indicates that most Japanese citizens
consider Ramseyer’s unacceptable IRLE article to include groundbreaking findings that reject the
CWS as sexual slavery. However, as I have tried to show throughout this paper, and as other critics
have pointed out, his article is no better than crude Japanese history denialists’ works in the 1990s.
The strengthening of the historical denialist movement and the transfer of power from the
progressive to a more right-wing government in Korea in 2022 may lead Japanese history
denialists and Ramseyer to feel very optimistic about the possibility of resolving the CWI without
the Japanese government’s acknowledgement of “comfort women” as sexual slaves. However,
Korean people and international human rights organizations will not allow the two governments
to make another political deal to quickly resolve the issue. The redress movement for over thirty
years with “comfort women’s” public testimonies has enhanced people’s imagery and memory of
“comfort women” as sexual slaves. Moreover, given the heightened consciousness of minority
members’ and women’s human rights in the twenty-first century, not only Koreans, but also global
citizens and international human rights organizations will not allow the two governments to treat
the victims of JMSS as commercial sex workers.
woman” statue was installed in Manila, the Philippines in December 2017, but it was taken down in 2018, under the
Japanese Foreign Ministry’s pressure to the Filipino government.
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What happened in the summer of 2022 has supported my positive expectations. In 2021
and 2022, the Japanese government diplomatically put pressure on the German local government
in Berlin to remove the Statue of Peace (a Korean “comfort girl” statue) installed in downtown
Berlin in September 2020. Ok-soon Joo and three other members of the Comfort Women Fraud
Clearing Regiment (another anti- “comfort women” organization in Korea) visited Berlin at the
end of June 2022 to demonstrate against the statue (Yonhap News, 2022). They held the placard,
chanting, “Stop the comfort women scam,” in front of the Korean girl’s statue between June 26
and 30, 2022. About 100 members of the local Korean Council that installed the “comfort girl”
statue and, surprisingly, many other members of local German organizations held a protest against
the Korean demonstrating team, such as the Japan Women’s Federation in Berlin. German citizens
chanted, “Go home” and “Learn more,” while the members of the Koran redress organization in
Berlin performed Korean music/dance performances. Rejecting the Japanese Embassy’s request,
the local Berlin government allowed the Korean redress organization to keep the statue there
permanently. The fact that not only German citizens, but also members of Japan Women’s
Federation in Berlin participated in the demonstration against Korean history denialists indicates
that the CWI is an important women’s human rights issue rathe than the Japanese-Korean
diplomatic issue. Truth prevailed in Berlin this summer. It will continue to prevail everywhere.

Concluding Remarks
The Korean Council formally started the redress movement for the victims of Japanese
military sexual slavery in 1990. It helped many KCW break their long silence and give testimonies
in Japan, the United States, and many international human rights organizations. Based on their
testimonies and historical documents, the UN Commission on Human Rights and other
international human rights organizations interpreted the CWS as sexual slavery and sent tough
recommendations to the Japanese government to resolve the CWI honorably. However, the
Japanese government, led by the late Shinzō Abe and other conservative Liberal Democratic Party
members, continued to ignore these internationally accepted facts. Despite the Japanese
government’s consistent refusal to accept recommendations by international human rights
organizations, the redress movement has greatly contributed to raising our consciousness of sexual
violence against women during the war and in occupied regions as an important women’s human
rights issue.
As a professor specializing in Japanese legal studies at a major law school in the United
States, Ramseyer surely must have been aware of all these studies, resolutions, testimonies, and
judgments. However, like other Japanese neo-nationalist scholars, he not only ignored them but
also failed to even mention them in his article and claimed the CWS as a commercial prostitution
system based on labor contracts. This shows callousness on his part towards the “comfort women”
who were brutalized during the Asia-Pacific War and stigmatized, traumatized, and marginalized
after the war ended due to living in patriarchal cultures that shame victims of sexual violence.
However, more pertinent to his article, this rebuttal and his actions show a negligent, one-sided,
and biased scholarship.
Due to the prevalence of ultra-nationalism and historical revisionism in Japan during the
last three decades, there are many Japanese-language magazines and books that have interpreted
the CWS as commercial prostitution. However, Ramseyer’s article may be the only one with this
type of historical revisionist theme regarding this particular issue to be published in an Englishlanguage journal outside of Japan. We scholars improve social science knowledge in a particular
field of study by adding greater information to accumulated knowledge. Ramseyer’s article cannot
be considered as an academic paper since he ignored the relevant literature.
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Ramseyer used two key arguments to deny the forced mobilization of KCW to JMB. First,
he argued that there was no historical document available in Korea in post-war years that indicated
the forced mobilization of KCW to JMB, and that Seiji Yoshida’s 1983 discredited book first
spread the stories of the forced mobilization of KCW. He devoted many pages of his 2022 paper
to this argument. He made these untenable arguments due to his ignorance of the literature on the
redress movement in South Korea. I cited three of the many Korean newspaper/magazine articles
published in the post-war years in Korea that reported the forced mobilization of many Korean
girls and women to JMB.
His other major argument is that he cannot accept KCW’s testimonies as credible evidence
for determining whether the CWS was sexual slavery or not. This is the typical Japanese history
denialists’ dogmatic position. But his rejection of KCW’s testimonies as credible evidence goes
against the long tradition of the criminal justice system that has accepted victims’ testimonies as
the key evidence. Moreover, the Kono Statement accepted the forced mobilization of KCW mainly
based on Japanese officials’ interviews with about twenty KCW. Also, a Japanese court admitted
the involuntary mobilization of KCW based on KCW’s testimonies (C. Kim, 1998). In addition,
the UN Human Right Commission and other international human rights organizations used
“comfort women’s” testimonies as a major data source for their judgments.
Ramseyer claimed that he could not trust KCW’s testimonies mainly because Korean
redress activists and scholars emphasized the forced mobilization of KCW based on a small
number of testimonies given by the KCW closely attached to the Korean Council. I have provided
detailed information about how objectively, eight volumes of 103 KCW’s testimonies were
collected by volunteer female faculty members and graduate students. Moreover, 103 testimonies
comprise a sample large enough for statistical analyses. Since social science knowledge is based
on probability rather than certainty, we should determine whether the CWS was sexual slavery or
not based on the principle of the majority.
The major findings demonstrate that the vast majority of KCW (81%) were forcibly
mobilized to JMB. The fact that 93% of them were mobilized at age 20 or younger indicates that
they were illegally taken to JMB, involving the Japanese military government’s violations of three
international conventions it had signed. Moreover, the mobilization of the vast majority of KCW
at 20 or before rejects Ramseyer’s claim that most KCW originated from commercial prostitution
houses in Korea. He made that claim without providing data that KCW received fees for their
sexual services according to their labor contracts. However, only nine KCW, assigned to officers’
clubs or prostitution houses, received regular fees, with the majority having not received any
payment. Without citing any data, Ramseyer claimed that they could leave JMB when they wished.
However, they were detained inside JMB under tight surveillance and encountered brutal sexual
and physical violence by Japanese soldiers. The story of throwing grenades to kill running-away
KCW is far from the story Ramseyer provided. He claimed that his 2021 article tried to explain
how “comfort station” owners and “comfort women” agreed on labor contracts. But he did not
provide any new piece of evidence for labor contracts in his 2022 paper. Also, my analysis of 103
KCW’s testimonies indicates that no KCW mentioned her labor contract. It is impossible for none
of them mentioned her labor contract, if all KCW had received labor contracts.
Ramseyer’s severe attacks on the Korean Council, the major readdress organization in
Korea, indicates his ignorance of the history of the redress organization, its major staff members,
its main goals, and contribution. His attacks also indicate his ignorance of international law. In
his historical revisionist view, the Korean Council is a highly nationalistic anti-Japanese
organization that has strengthened the negative image of Japan by publicizing Japanese military
sexual slavery globally. However, the main goal of the Korean Council has been to make the
Japanese government acknowledge the CWS as sexual slavery and to make a sincere apology and
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reparation to “comfort women” to bring dignity and justice to them. As the major redress
organization for the victims of Japanese military sexual slavery, the Korean Council has needed to
put pressure on the Japanese government. I wonder whether Ramseyer considers many Japanese
citizens and organizations, who actively participated in the redress movement, as anti-Japanese or
not. Representing the Japanese right-wing neo-nationalists, Ramseyer labelled the Korean Council
and its staff members and other redress activists in Korea and the United States as “left-wing
communists” and “Stalinists.” His frequent use of these ideological terms has made his paper more
like a propaganda book, rather than an academic paper.
Finally, I would like to make a very critical comment on Ramseyer’s repeated complaints
about the defamation law enforced in Korea. Japanese government officials complained to the UN
Human Rights Commission and other international human rights organizations, indicating that it
was unfair for them to make judgements about the past events using contemporary international
laws. However, legal teams working for these organizations tried to convince Japanese
government representatives that the Japanese military’s establishment and management of the
“comfort women” system involved violations of international conventions, the anti-slavery law,
and the crime against humanity, all international regulations made before the Japanese military
started the “comfort women” system in 1932.
The Japanese “comfort women” system violated a number of international regulations
made more than ninety years ago. Fortunately, we have witnessed radical changes in terms of
minority racial/ethnic groups and women’s human rights over the past ninety years. Several statues
of white American supremacists have been removed in the United States over the last several years.”
When Korean, Chinese, and Filipino redress activists installed a “comfort women” statue in San
Francisco in 2017, they emphasized the lack of statues of women in public places in the city (only
two statues of white women, out of 87 statues), especially statues of non-white women (Mirkinson,
2020,150). These progressive groups in the United States have made great efforts to remove white
supremacists’ statues to achieve what they call “retroactive justice” over the past two decades.
When we look at Japanese military sexual slavery from contemporary progressive
perspectives, it is the most brutal form of sexual slavery possible. The current Japanese
government’s and history denialists’ effort to conceal the past crimes by demolishing “comfort
women’s” statues installed in the Philippines, the United States, and Germany is an anachronistic
shameful behavior that has tainted the global image of Japan. Ramseyer has defamed KCW by
treating these victims of sexual slavery as commercial sex workers. He repeatedly claimed that his
academic interpretation of KCW as commercial sex workers with labor contracts did not involve
his value judgment. But, by treating the victims of the most rigid form of Japanese military sexual
slavery as commercial sex workers with no supporting data, he greatly defamed KCW. He cannot
criticize the defamation law enforced in South Korea. Most other countries have similar laws to
protect innocent victims.
As I have tried to show throughout this paper, Ramseyer’s 2021 article and 2022 paper
cannot be considered as academic works based on relevant data and logical arguments. Neither of
the product includes a literature review of the CWS and the redress movement for the victims of
JMSS. They include many arguments with no supporting data. Many paragraphs distort or
mischaracterize already-discovered facts. Many other paragraphs are based on history denialists’
articles and books. I wonder how the reviewers of his 2021 article and the editorial committee of
IRLE accepted his paper for publication. I understand the journal has not yet made a decision on
whether or not to retract his article for three years. I urge IRLE to take responsible action quickly
and clarify the journal’s procedures of having accepted his unacceptable article.
Ramseyer’s interpretation of Asian victims of JMSS as voluntary sex workers with labor
contracts include not only empirical and logical problems in his research activities, but also
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ethnical and academic-integrity problems related to the conflict of interest and the defamation of
research subjects. We all know that he wrote the 2021 article and 2022 paper to save the Japanese
government and Japanese history denialists from their continuous defeats in the “history wars” -their utmost effort to prevent “comfort girl” statues / “comfort women” memorials installed, and
the sexual slavery story included in history textbooks—in the United States in the 2010s. As earlier
noted, he won the “Order of the Rising Sun Award” for his “extensive contributions to the
development of Japanese studies in the U.S” from the Consul-General of Japan in Boston in 2018.
He has been accepted as a savior of the Japanese government and Japanese history denialists after
the publication of his “peer-review” article. He has openly accepted his hero role by participating
in meetings and conferences organized by Japanese history denialist organizations. Ramseyer has
also defamed brutalized and powerless Asian “comfort women” victims by treating them as
commercial sex workers with no evidence. In my own university system when CUNY faculty
members propose a research project whose findings are likely to either greatly benefit or hurt
individuals or organizations based on distortions of the truth, Institutional Review Boards prevent
them from conducting their research. I wonder how Harvard University has allowed Ramseyer to
conduct research to help the Japanese government and Japanese history denialists conceal the
crime of Japanese military sexual slavery, “research” that results in continued harm and trauma to
survivors and their families?
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